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Abstract 
This paper provides an original theoretical framework to better understand the raise of private 
standards in agrifood chains. Reasons for the emergence and conditions for the effectiveness of 
private standards are identified, by investigating retailers’ strategic behaviour and, more precisely, 
both interactions among retailers and upstream producers and the role of consumer behaviour vis-à-
vis the food safety risk. We show that a relatively strict Minimum Quality Standard (MQS) may 
incentive the retailer to develop an even more demanding private standard, when market-driven 
incentive is relatively high; this result crucially depends on consumer risk misperception. Setting a 
private standard may improve market access for upstream producers. In addition, it may reduce food 
safety risk and, at the same time, improve consumer surplus. 
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Introduction 
 
Contemporary agrifood systems are increasingly pervaded by a plethora of private 
quality standards that have emerged in a context of increasing consumer concerns about the 
sustainability of food (including environmental and safety considerations, nutritional aspects, 
product authenticity, equity within the supply chain, etc.). The implementation of these 
standards has been especially prominent among large food retailers, food manufacturers and 
food service operators, reflecting both their considerable market power and competitive 
strategies based around ‘own’ or private brands that tie a retailer’s reputation and 
performance to product’s quality.  
Here, the communication on product quality, which often bundles a variety of 
attributes, such as food safety, environmental, ethical or social aspects, may be more or less 
direct, and realized through sub-brands on retailer private label (identified by a specific logo 
or a symbol), e.g. Field-to-Fork (Marks and Spencer, UK), Nature’s Choice/Nurture (Tesco, 
UK), “EQC-Engagement Qualité Carrefour” (Carrefour, France), “Gold Star” (BI-LO, US), 
“Sheffield & Sons” or “Nature’s Place” chicken1 (Delhaize Group-owned US grocer Bloom), 
or “Nature’s Pride” (PM Beef Holdings LLC, US)2, and, more in general, through retailer 
claims on the quality of own-brand products. Own-brand reputation may also rely on most 
often “invisible” standards such as the McDonald’s Supplier Quality Management System 
(SQMS)3 or Nestlé Quality System (NQS). 
These private voluntary standards (in the terminology of Henson and Humphrey, 2010) 
often rely on direct relationships with upstream suppliers. Hence, vertical coordination is 
needed to build consumer confidence through consistency in standards implementation 
(Henson and Reardon, 2005); since these standards are individual in nature, vertical 
coordination is realized through more or less contractualized buyer-supplier relationships. In 
this framework, suppliers are required specifications that are often more restrictive than 
public regulations4 and may require considerable investments to upgrade agricultural 
production practices5 (e.g. handling and hygiene practices, equipment and buildings for 
chemical storage, hygiene and temperature controlled facilities, pesticide storage units, 
pesticides disposal pits, technical skills, etc.). The further the farm is from meeting the 
requirement, the more costly to upgrade (OECD, 2007)6. However, the issue is not the 
                                                 
1 “Sheffield & Sons” offers only USDA Choice Angus beef that only comes from south-western Minnesota. 
Growers are committed to producing superior-quality beef following exacting production specifications. 
“Nature’s Place” chicken has no additives, no enhancements and is antibiotic free; poultry is raised with no 
chemical medicines, no growth stimulants or hormones and receives an all-vegetable diet. Nature’s Place 
chicken suppliers are industry leaders in the quality of their products and operations (Source: 
http://www.shopbloom.com/Explore/Meat). 
2 PM Beef Holdings is a leading processor and supplier of meat products to consumers, retailers, and 
foodservice operators. PM Beef quality management system either meets or exceeds regulatory standards for 
humane treatment of animals, quality and food safety (http://pmbeef.com/assets/HACCP-Letter-1QTR-
2012.pdf).  
3 McDonald’s SQMS includes food safety/quality system expectations for suppliers globally, e.g. an 
“Antibiotics Use Policy” (www.aboutmcdonalds.com).  
4 As highlighted by Henson and Humphrey (2010), private standards “go beyond” public regulations in two 
ways: either they take the form of more stringent standards, or they implement controls on issues that are not 
covered by public regulations. 
5 Hence, whilst public regulations most often concern what outcomes are to be achieved, private standards 
mainly focus on how such outcomes are to be achieved (Henson and Humphrey, 2010; Hammoudi et al. 2009) 
or how to operationalise process-based requirement. Hence, they may be considered as an ‘input normalization’ 
strategy. 
6 Several studies analyze the process of compliance with private standards (and the related costs) in an open 
Economy by focusing on the impact of GlobalGap on developing countries. Not only are individual private 
standards such as Tesco Nature’s Choice (TNC) or Marks and Spencer Field to Fork more stringent, but there is 
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compliance cost itself, but rather the cost in relation to the profitability of the business that 
also depends on market opportunities. Hence, these strategies may also influence retailers’ 
quantity/price decisions to adapt in fine to demand and competitive environment dynamics. 
A wide literature aims at explaining the emergence of private standards in agrifood 
chains. First, private standards perform a function of “procurement regulation” in 
intermediary markets (Giraud-Héraud et al. 2012). Hence, procurement becomes 
progressively broader in geographical scope: concentration within food retailing is driving a 
shift towards buyer-driven supply chains that are extending beyond regional and national 
boundaries with the emergence of multinational retailers, food service operators and 
manufacturers. In this context, private standards allows to standardize over suppliers, and 
reduce procurement transaction costs, e.g. suppliers identification and approval audits, 
routine supplier site visits, routing end-product laboratory, chemical, biochemical or 
microbial testing, etc. (Holleran et al. 1999); for example, third party certification transfers 
auditing costs from retailers onto suppliers, while enhancing the credibility of production 
practices (Hatanaka, 2005; Henson and Northen, 1998). 
Second, private standards provide additional security for firms against the risk of food 
safety failures and the consequent strategic costs (e.g. loss of market share, loss of market 
revenue, erosion of brand capital, etc.) and operational costs (e.g. product recall, customer 
complaints, and penalties from enforcement authorities, these latter depending on the extent 
of liability rules7). Private standards thus afford “domain defense” (Caswell and Johnson, 
1991) thus protecting market share and reputation (Fulponi, 2006). 
Third, private standards allow firms to take advantage of market opportunities through 
product differentiation (“domain offence”). Trends in consumer demand have put greater 
focus on product quality. Food scares in a number of industrialised countries have raised 
consumer concerns about the safety of food and eroded confidence in prevailing mechanisms 
of food safety control; at the same time, consumers have increasingly focused on a broader 
array of food attributes when assessing product quality, many of which are experience or 
credence ones. In this context, the possibility to capture a premium price based on 
consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for quality improvements may drive retailers to move 
beyond public regulations towards adopting more demanding private standards (Garella and 
Petrakis, 2008; Giraud-Héraud et al., 2006)8. 
Given these premises, it is an accepted idea that retailers will arguably have the greatest 
incentive to implement private standards when there are missing or inadequate public 
institutions (Henson and Reardon, 2005). When the MQS do not preexist, private standards 
allow to replace “missing” institutions, and protect the reputation of retailers (Reardon and 
                                                                                                                                                        
a significant overlap between these standards and GlobalGap, so much that third party audits of suppliers are 
often undertaken simultaneously. These studies show that compliance costs may be appreciable (Graffham et al. 
2007) and highlight the role of non-recurring costs associated with buildings and facilities that farmers must 
establish as a precondition to implement the standard (Asfaw et al. 2008). While one-time investments represent 
“entry costs” for producers, the issue of recurring costs (such as recurrent audit and certification, record keeping 
on chemical use, protecting clothing, variable inputs such are safer pesticides, training, soil analysis, etc) is at 
the heart of the issue of the long-term viability of the compliance system (PIP, 2009). 
7 Private standards perform a “liability function” in the sense they provide additional security vis-à-vis the threat 
of civil legal actions against a firm producing unsafe food (and the resulting financial damages) (Hobbs, 2004). 
Liability rules are thus crucial for private standards to emerge (Giraud-Héraud et al. 2012). For example, the 
1990 Food Safety Act (FSA) in the UK has significantly affected quality management practices within the food 
sector. The FSA requires retailers to be proactive regarding the safety of food in their possession, assigning 
retailers responsibility for both the safety of the supplies retailers procure as well as the food they handle. The 
increased buyer/seller interaction forced retailers to closely monitor suppliers because retailers needed to verify 
and monitor the safety of supplier production processes, in addition to their own internal processes. 
8Moreover, private standards on own-branded products increase retailers’ differentiation in the product range 
(increasing variety proposed to consumers) and consequently lessen retailing competition. 
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Farina, 2002), or to pre-empt future regulations (Lutz et al., 2000; Segerson, 1999). In 
addition, MQS may be “inadequate” in the sense that they do not provide sufficient scope for 
a quality-based product differentiation and to reward firms for investments in quality 
management systems (Reardon et al. 2001); here, private standards allow retailers to 
differentiate on a quality basis and gain market share9. 
Nevertheless, a direct relationship between the laxity of public regulation and the raise 
of private standards is not necessarily confirmed by facts. Even if some private initiatives had 
preceded the establishment of a regulatory framework, e.g. under the pressure of increasing 
liability rules at national level, it appears that the landscape of private standard is highly 
dynamic and continuously evolves towards more restrictive requirements despite the 
progressive strengthening of market access conditions set by public authorities. In this paper, 
we investigate the mechanisms driving the emergence of private standards by developing an 
original model of Industrial Organization and we show that even when the minimum quality 
standard (MQS) is relatively high, firms may have incentive to move beyond it. Namely, the 
decision to set a private standard is shown to depend on the complex interaction among 
market-driven incentives (quantity/price strategy according to consumer behaviour toward 
the risk10) and the level of effort (or cost) required to ensure the quality of procurement 
(selection and remuneration of upstream suppliers). Furthermore we analyse the conditions 
for private standard effectiveness for the supply chain stakeholders (notably upstream 
suppliers and consumers). 
More specifically, our model considers both (i) consumer reaction to the level of risk, 
this latter being interpreted as the probability that the product does not meet consumer 
expectations about product quality and (ii) the role of vertical relationships and the 
heterogeneity of suppliers in terms of food safety characteristics.  
On the demand side, following the seminal paper by Polinsky and Rogerson (1983), we 
consider that consumers react to the perceived rather than to the actual level of risk. Hence, 
even if consumers receive more or less precise information about product attributes, they may 
misperceive product quality (respectively, risk), with important consequences on firms’ 
strategic behaviour (e.g. Yeung and Yee, 2002, McCarthy and Henson, 2005). First, 
consumers are imperfect problem solvers, who collect limited information upon which to 
base their choices (Henson and Traill, 1993)11. Second, the information set available to 
consumers is itself imperfect12. Finally, individual consumers are less informed than firms 
about the nature of products. In this context, especially when credence attributes are 
concerned, consumers rely upon “external risk indicators” or “risk relievers” to infer product 
quality (e.g. brands, product information, price, the nature of food packaging, the nature of 
                                                 
9Several studies in the literature on MQS show that MQS may reduce the average quality offered on the market 
and/or decrease variety (Scarpa, 1998; Cramps and Hollander, 1995; Ronnen, 1991). Firms may have thus 
strong incentive to differentiate themselves on a quality basis from those competitors that operate at or near the 
MQS. 
10  In this paper we use the term “risk” to specify the probability that the product does not meet consumers’ 
expected quality. The concept of risk in the food sector thus concerns the chance that the product may not meet 
taste expectations, money is wasted, a poor meal is served to guest (Feng et al., 2010; McCarthy and Henson, 
2005), and also the health (e.g. fat content) or safety (e.g. food poisoning) risks and, more in general, those risks 
related to characteristics that are not verifiable by consumers even after purchase, i.e. the so-called “credence 
qualities” (Darby and Karni, 1973). 
11 The result of these imperfections is biases in the subjective probabilities generated by consumers for different 
risky outcomes. For example, several studies show a systematic primary bias in probability estimation with high 
risks tending to be underestimated and low risk overestimated (Feng et al. 2010; Verbeke et al., 2007; Sparks 
and Shepherd, 1994).  
12 As regards to food safety, for example, all food-borne risks factors fall into the experience categories (e.g. 
acute food risk factors, salmonellosis and other food poisonings) and credence ones (e.g. chronic food risk 
factors, such as nutritional imbalance in the diet, food additives or pesticide residues). 
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the food store and its ability to handle produce, etc.), i.e. “a piece of information that 
increases the likelihood of product success” (Kornelis et al., 2007; McCarthy and Henson, 
2005; Mitchell and McGoldrick, 1996). Indeed, several contributions show consumers’ WTP 
for a quality/safety improvement, while this latter is not directly observable (Loureiro and 
Umberger, 2007; Grunert, 2005). Moreover, the higher the perceived risk, the more 
consumers tend to use risk relievers (and use them more frequently)13 and are willing to pay 
for quality improvements (Angulo and Gil, 2007; Brown et al., 2005). 
On the supply side, we take into account the specific features of agricultural markets 
(downstream concentration vis-à-vis an atomized upstream supply) and we consider a 
downstream retailer that has a monopolist position towards the final market and a 
monopsonist position towards upstream suppliers. Suppliers are differentiated according to 
their equipment levels, which in turn determine the risk associated with their supply. The risk 
of product failure is thus assumed to be endogenous and to result from upstream 
characteristics14. The compliance with a public MQS or a private standard might lead 
producers to undertake investments in order to access to the intermediary market. 
In this context, the downstream retailer faces a quality-quantity trade-off in the following 
sense. Raising the standard lowers the risk associated with each unit of product sold on the 
market, while, for a given level of standard, an increase of the commercialized quantity 
increases the risk. Hence, reinforcing a relatively strict MQS with an even more demanding 
private standard by encouraging an upgrading of upstream production practices may be 
needed to avoid the risk-increasing effect of increasing volumes. Hence, this normalization 
strategy enables the retailer to benefit from an increased WTP (especially when consumers 
tend to overestimate the risk) and thus increase volumes. However, also the reinforcement of 
a relatively weak MQS may be optimal for the retailer since this strategy enables to reduce 
the risk by restricting volumes without encouraging any supplier equipments’ upgrading. 
Looking in more details into the retailer incentives, we show that the retailer’s strategy 
depends both on the level of consumer risk misperception and on the level of the public 
MQS. On the one hand, when consumers underestimate (or correctly perceive) the risk, the 
retailer reinforces the MQS without encouraging an upgrading of upstream production 
practices (and only selects “the best producers”). On the other hand, when consumers highly 
overestimate the risk, the retailer always reinforces the MQS by encouraging an improvement 
of upstream production conditions. In the most interesting intermediate case (i.e. when 
consumers overestimate the risk, but overestimation is not too high), both strategies may be 
optimal, according to the level of MQS: the retailer may either reinforce the MQS by 
selecting the best equipped producers (if the MQS is relatively weak) or by encouraging an 
improvement of production practices (if the MQS is relatively strict). 
Furthermore, we analyse the effectiveness of private standards for both consumers 
and upstream suppliers. On the consumers’ side, we highlight the reasons why strengthening 
precautions on the criteria for market access is not always a synonym of risk reduction 
(raising the standard, even if it reassure consumers, may imply an increase of commercialized 
quantities and consequently of the average risk). However, it appears that when firms have 
interest in implementing a private standard, the risk is reduced and, at the same time, 
consumer surplus may be improved. Indeed, we show that consumer risk misperception 
                                                 
13 For example, McCarthy and Henson (2005) show that “sceptic consumers”, who have the lowest level of 
confidence in their ability to select beef and were least interested in beef, are the group that used the most risk 
reduction strategies. This lack of perceived ability manifested itself in both the intensive and wider use of risk 
relievers. Similarly, Kornelis et al. (2007) show that those who have a low perceived “health control” (that is 
they believe themselves to be personally powerless to influence their own health outcomes resulting from 
exposure to food safety hazards) indicate the highest intended use for product label information. 
14 This assumption is crucial since it makes it possible to isolate the influence of the retailer’s strategic 
behaviour on the risk, regardless of the role that he may play from a technical point of view. 
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requires taking into account both criteria when assessing private standards’ impact on 
consumers, i.e. the actual risk and the ‘classical’ surplus criterion (this latter based on the 
perceived risk and taking into account the perceived risk that the product does not correspond 
to consumers’ expectation). This enables to highlight the possible contrasting effects (reduced 
risk but worst surplus). 
On the suppliers’ side, we show that reinforcing the MQS with a more demanding private 
standard may improve market access. The extent of this effect increases in the level of 
consumer risk overestimation. In this sense, we depart from the accepted idea that private 
standards act to exclude (notably smallholder) farmers. The exclusion effect is mainly 
explained in the literature by the fact that ‘entry costs’ in terms of farm upgrading may be 
prohibitively large for small scale growers thus excluding them from the more safety-
discerning high-value supermarket global chains15. Products marketed through these chains 
have to be third-party certified as meeting standards such as GlobalGap, Tesco Nature’s 
Choice (TNC), or Farm to Fork (Okello et al. 2011; Dolan and Humphrey, 2000). 
Nevertheless, the evidence on private standards’ impact on farmers is mixed, with some 
studies showing smallholder ‘inclusion effects’, opportunities provided to smallholders by 
buyer-driven supply chains (Lee et al. 2010) and/or revenue/productivity gains for farmers 
having achieved compliance16. In this vein, we show that producers’ exclusion does not only 
depend on the level of the compliance costs itself, but also on the supply chain structure and 
notably on the strategic behaviour of the downstream retailer, both towards the upstream and 
the downstream market. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 1 we present the model. 
In section 2 the private standard setting game. The retailer procurement and normalization 
strategy is presented in sections 3. Private standard’s effectiveness for producers and 
consumers is presented in section 4. 
 
1. The basic model 
We consider a vertical relationship between J heterogeneous upstream producers and a 
downstream retailing firm. This “retailer”17 acts as a monopoly in the final market and has a 
monopsony power in purchasing the input from producers. Each producer can supply one unit 
of input, and the retailer is assumed to buy x units (x ≤ J). The downstream stage may 
concern processing, preserving, conditioning or packing operations. For the sake of simplicity 
we suppose that the retailer converts the x units of inputs into y units of a finished product, 
according to the fixed proportion production function y = T(x), where we simply set T(x)=x. 
As explained in the introduction of the paper, the retailer is assumed not to influence the risk 
of product failure and the risk is assumed to technically result from upstream production 
characteristics. 
                                                 
15 A number of empirical studies have examined smallholders’ adoption of private collective standards (e.g. 
GlobalGap, BRC, IFS, etc.) mainly focused on the impact of GlobalGap in developing countries. These studies 
mostly suggest that private standards act to generate small farmers’ exclusion predominantly due to high 
compliance costs (Graffham et al., 2007; Jaffee, 2003; Dolan and Humphrey, 2000).  
16 Some studies provide evidence of smallholders maintaining or enhancing their role in export value chains 
(e.g. Gulati et al. 2007; Minten et al, 2006; Minot and Ngigi, 2004). As noted by Lee et al. (2010), despite the 
rise of industrialized farming, production in buyer-driven chains is often smallholder-based, partially 
attributable to the relatively greater efficiency of smallholders in land and labour use. In addition, some studies 
show appreciable gains for producers that have achieved compliance in terms of productivity, revenues, 
producer prices or reduced pesticide application, etc. (Kariuki et al. 2012; Henson et al. 2011; Maertens and 
Swinnen, 2009; Okello and Swinton, 2009; Asfaw et al. 2008). 
17 In the rest of the paper, we denote “retailer” the downstream firm. Of course, this “retailer” may also 
represent a large-sized processing firm and its strategy of product standardisation. 
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Consumers’ risk perception and demand function 
The demand function of the consumers is the result of the maximization of a utility 
function, taking into account that the risk is communicated on the market.18 Considering that 
this communication is not perfect and not necessarily well done, or considering that the 
psychological behaviour of the consumers is unpredictable, we suppose that the risk may be 
overestimated or underestimated. In our model, the utility function for a representative 
consumer takes the form: 
2xU ( x ) ( s )x M ( s 0 )
2
        (1) 
The formula (1) is a modified version of the standard quadratic utility function. Thus x 
represents the quantity of good bought by the representative consumer and M=Y-px denotes 
the expenditure on outside goods. The parameter s is the perception of risk by the consumer, 
which may increase the utility according to food safety considerations. We suppose that this 
evaluation is a function of the actual risk  of product failure and of a parameter 0   
measuring the “consumers’ misperception” of the risk (following the terminology used by 
Polinsky and Rogerson, 1983). When 1  , consumers correctly perceive the actual level of 
risk. When 1   consumers underestimate the risk and when 1   consumers overestimate 
the risk. Thus we write s   the risk perceived by consumers. The utility maximization 
with respect to x gives the (inverse) demand function for the representative consumer, 
p( ,x ) x      (2) 
Equation (2) is similar to the linear demand function used by Polinsky and Rogerson19. 
This specification makes it possible to take into account two mechanisms: for a given 
quantity x, (i) the higher the level of   the higher the perceived risk   and thus the lower 
consumer willingness to pay (WTP), which is measured by the expression (  ); (ii) the 
higher the level of   the stronger the WTP-increasing effect of a risk reduction. 
For the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume J 2 J
2
    .20 
Producers’ equipment and risk 
Upstream producers are differentiated according to their level of “equipment”, which 
represents the value of the initial infrastructure of a producer. The equipments are measured 
by a one-dimensional parameter e, uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1]  according to 
the density function f (e) 1 . The individual risk arising from each producer, whose level of 
equipment is e, is denoted by (e) 1 e   . Hence, the risk is maximum with a producer 
                                                 
18 Sanitary risk reduction may be in fact communicated either by the government through public certifications or 
by different firms’ brands and logos. For example, in the case of pesticide reduction in agrifood products, there 
exist a wide number of certifications, from the “Integrated Pest Management” to organic certifications. US 
retailers have widely developed, since the beginning of the 90s, products with « certification for pesticide 
residue-free ». Note that several studies (see for example Ott, 1990; Misra et al, 1991, Eom, 1994) have 
attempted to assess the effect of these signals on consumer behaviour. 
19 In order to regain the demand function of Polinsky and Rogerson we have to pose ( 1 )l   , where the 
parameter   is interpreted as a measure of the extent of consumer risk misperception and l represents the 
monetary loss for each unit of the product that fails.  
20 The condition J 2    is necessary to always have p(s,x) > 0 and the condition 2 J  simplifies the 
presentation of all the results we can obtain with this model. 
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characterized by the minimum level of equipment ( (0) 1  ) and zero with a producer 
characterized by the maximum level of equipment ( (1) 0  ). 
Since the retailer has to deal with different suppliers, some producers who are involved 
in the intermediary market may not supply inputs meeting the “ideal situation” of zero risk 
(i.e. if we do not consider the trade-off between risk and product prices). The heterogeneity of 
inputs will thus determine an average risk for the processed product. Since all upstream 
producers supply the same quantity, the risk of a failure in the final market exclusively 
depends on the density function f (e ) , and on the probability of failure (e )  of each 
upstream producer involved in the intermediary market. This average risk is endogenous in 
the sense that it will depend on the investments of upstream producers to improve their initial 
equipments. 
The benchmark with a Minimum Quality Standard 
In the benchmark situation, upstream production characteristics can only be regulated 
by a public Minimum Quality Standard (MQS) 0e 0 . Consequently, only producers with 
equipment such that 0e e  can supply the intermediary market. Setting the MQS determines 
what we denote the “eligible supply” 0 0xˆ J(1 e )  . Moreover we assume that the 
compliance with 0e , for a producer of type e, implies a fixed cost that takes the simple form 
Max{0; 0e e }.21 
Given the MQS 0e , the retailer chooses the quantity x to market. Since we consider that 
the downstream retailer has a monopsonist position towards upstream producers, then he has 
complete negotiation power in the definition of the intermediary price  . Following Xia and 
Sexton (2004), who model this kind of intermediary market, the retailer thus sets the quantity 
x by anticipating the necessary price in order to obtain this quantity x from the upstream 
producers. Hence, the intermediary price is strictly positive only if the quantity exceeds the 
eligible supply and remunerates the lowest initially non-eligible equipment that has to be 
upgraded to satisfy retailer’s demand.22 
We denote by ,0 0(e x )  the intermediary price paid to producers in the benchmark 
situation. If 0ˆx x  the retailer involves producers with equipment levels between 0e  and 1 
and ,0 0(e x) 0  . If 0ˆx x , the minimum price paid to producers should be such 
that ,0 0 0(e x ) e e( x )    where e( x )  defines the threshold of equipment starting from which 
producers are involved in the intermediary market. 
Given the initial uniform distribution of the J upstream producers, the total quantity 
supplied on the intermediary market is given by J( 1 e ) . At these conditions, the 
                                                 
21Given the heterogeneity of upstream supply, this cost function allows to explicitly take into account the 
heterogeneity of the compliance costs. For an illustration of this heterogeneity in the empirical literature, see for 
example Kleinwechter and Grethe (2006). 
22 We assume that the downstream retailer does not have the possibility to discriminate between upstream 
producers. Hence the intermediary price is the same for all the suppliers, regardless of their initial level of 
equipment. This assumption is consistent with several buyer-supplier relationships observed in agrifood supply 
chains (see Giraud-Héraud et al., 2012) and with the fact that intermediate price is usually negotiated between 
the retailer and the Producers Organizations and/or the cooperatives, and rarely between the processing and/or 
retailing firm and each of the upstream farmers. Indeed, it is noteworthy that individual contracts rarely exist in 
the agrifood sector (see for example, Royer, 1998, Kleinwechter and Grethe, 2006, and Malorgio and Grazia, 
2009, for an analysis of the role of Producers Organizations in the implementation of GlobalGAP by fruit and 
vegetables farmers). Note also that we have voluntarily left out the explicit formalization of the intermediation 
assured by the Producers Organization, with which the downstream retailer negotiates. 
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equalization of supply and demand on this market is such that x J( 1 e )  . This makes it 
possible to obtain the expression (3) below, which identifies the position of the initially less-
equipped (i.e. the riskiest) supplier, as a function of the quantity x demanded by the retailer. 
xe( x) 1
J
   (3) 
Thus, the intermediary price 0 0(e ,x)  is given by: 
0
0 0
0 0
ˆ0 if x x
( e , x ) x ˆ( 1 e ) if x x
J

    
 (4) 
Note that the position of the quantity x with respect to the eligible supply affects the 
average risk on the final market. If the quantity x does not exceed the eligible supply, we 
consider that the upstream producers involved in the intermediary market are randomly 
chosen between 0e  and 1.
23 Hence, the risk corresponds to the average risk of eligible 
equipments (located between 0e and 1) and is not affected by the quantity x. If 0ˆx x  the 
retailer also involves some initially not well-equipped producers (with equipments 
between e and 0e ) and an “additional” risk is associated to the eligible supply, i.e. the 
average risk associated with the initially non-eligible equipments. Indeed, suppliers’ 
equipments will be distributed on 0[ e ,1]  with a Dirac mass at 0e (i.e., all producers initially 
located between e  and 0e  invest in order to adopt the same level of equipment, 0e ).For a 
given standard 0e  and a given quantity x, the average risk 0 0( e , x )  is then given by: 
0
1
e0
1
0
0
0
0 0
0 0 0 0 0
e
1 e1 ˆ(e) f (e)de if x x
1 e 2
(e ,x )
1 J ˆ(e) f (e)de (e e ) (e ) (1 e )[1 (1 e )] if x x
1 e 2x


 
                  

 (5) 
For a given standard 0e  and a given quantity x, the retailer’s expected profit 0 0(e ,x)  is the 
following, 
0 0 0 0 0 0( e ,x ) [ p( ( e ,x ),x ) ( e ,x )]x     (6)  
Where the risk 0 0( e , x )  is given by (5), the intermediary price 0 0(e ,x)  by (4), and 
the final price 0 0p( (e ,x),x)  is obtained by substituting (5) into (2). 
We show in the Appendix that for every level of   and given the MQS 0e , there 
exist e ( )  and eˆ( )  increasing in  with ˆe ( ) e( )   , whereby the optimal quantity 
*
0 0x ( e ) set by the retailer in the benchmark situation is given by: 
                                                 
23 An alternative to this hypothesis would be to consider that producers involved in the relation with the retailer 
are selected from the right to the left on the segment [e0,1] in order to only hold the best producers. However, 
this strategy would assume the implementation of a selection by the retailer, which is comparable to the 
implementation of a private standard (see section 3 of the article).  
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0
0
*
0 0 0 0 0
0
0
1 (1 e )[ ] if e e ( )
2 2
ˆ ˆx ( e ) x J [1 e ] if e ( ) e e( )
[ (1 e )(1 )] ˆJ if e e( )
2( J 1)
  
 
  


           
 (7) 
Setting: 
2e ( ) 1
4J
eˆ( ) 1
( 2J 1)
 
 
   
   
 (8) 
We easily verify that *0 0x ( e )  is continuous in 0e . The thresholds e ( )  and 
eˆ( ) identify the relative position of this optimal quantity, with respect to the eligible supply. 
● When 0 ˆe e( ) , the MQS is relatively weak and the retailer does not exceed the 
eligible supply. In this context, raising the MQS below the level e ( )  generates the 
incentive for the retailer to increase quantity to benefit from the WTP improvement (for each 
positive level of  ). Beyond e ( ) , the retailer’s quantity exactly matches the eligible 
supply and decreases in the MQS. In this case, the retailer prefers to reduce the 
commercialized quantity when the MQS increases, in order to maintain at zero the 
intermediate price for suppliers. The average risk thus decreases as a result of the decrease of 
quantity. 
● When 0 ˆe e( ) , the quantity exceeds the eligible supply and the intermediary price 
becomes strictly positive. When the MQS increases, a trade-off arises between (i) decreasing 
quantity to reduce the intermediary price and (ii) increasing quantity in order to benefit from 
the WTP improvement. Note that the effect (ii) is positively influenced by the level of   (the 
higher  , the higher the incentive for the retailer to increase quantity as the MQS increases). 
As it will be detailed in section 3 below, the incentive for the retailer to increase 
quantity, when this latter exceeds the eligible supply, may generate an “unexpected” effect so 
that the average risk may increase in the MQS. Hence, the ‘reassuring’ effect that an increase 
of the MQS has on consumers may lead the retailer to increase quantities and procure from 
less safe suppliers. 
2. Private Standard Setting 
We suppose now that the retailer may require a more demanding (private) 
standard 1 0e e  for upstream suppliers to be selected, or not, and thus simply complies with 
the MQS ( 1 0e e ). In the same way as in the benchmark, we denote by 1 1xˆ J(1 e )   the 
eligible supply, which initially complies with the private standard and by ,1 1(e x )  the 
intermediary price paid to producers. 
The implementation of the private standard is set before the strategic choice of quantity, 
according to the following game, 
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Stage I. The retailer chooses the level of the private standard 1 0e e . 
Stage II. The retailer decides the quantity 1ˆx x  of inputs to purchase (stage II.1). The 
retailer then chooses N upstream producers ( N J ) and proposes an intermediary unit 
price   in order to obtain the quantity x (stage II.2). The N producers accept or reject 
this offer and upgrade their equipment if necessary (stage II.3). 
Stage III. The retailer converts the obtained inputs into a finished product and sells it 
on the final market. 
In stage I, we consider that the retailer sets-up the private standard, knowing the level 
of the MQS. The standard 1e  corresponds to the minimum level of equipment now required 
by the retailer for upstream producers to be selected. It affects the risk of product failure 
depending on whether the retailer’s strategy has an influence on producers’ equipments or 
not. As described previously in the benchmark, at the stage II of the game the retailer imposes 
to the upstream producers a “take it or leave it’ contract, fixing a unit price in order to obtain 
the quantity that maximizes his expected profit on the final market. Note however that in the 
case of private standard, the retailer cannot choose a quantity that is lower than the “eligible” 
quantity with respect to the standard. This constraint does not have any consequence on the 
issue of the proposed game, since there is no fixed cost to set a private standard more 
demanding than the MQS at the first stage.24 Then e(x) 1 x/ J   defines the threshold of 
equipment starting from which producers are involved in the intermediary market ( 1ˆx x  i.e. 
1e e ). 
According to the relative position of the quantity set at stage II with respect to 1xˆ , we 
distinguish two different possibilities of standards, 
(i) Standard with a “pure selection strategy”: the retailer selects only all the 
producers that are initially compliant with the standard set at stage I ( 1ˆx x  i.e. 
1e e ), thus no equipment upgrading is required for selected producers to supply 
the intermediary market. 
(ii) Standard with a “proactive strategy”: the retailer also involves some producers 
that are initially non-compliant with the standard set at stage I ( 1ˆx x  i.e. 1e e ), 
implying an equipments’ upgrading. 
This distinction will be useful in the rest of the paper, especially to discuss about the 
positive effects of standards with respect to upstream producers’ market access and consumer 
interests. 
In stage III, the retailer has a capacity constraint (given by x) in order to choose the 
quantity to market. The game is solved by backward induction. 
Optimal procurement 
Using the same arguments as in the benchmark situation, the intermediary price 
1 1(e ,x )  is the following, 
1
1 1
1 1
ˆ0 if x x
( e , x ) x ˆ( 1 e ) if x x
J

      
(9) 
                                                 
24 Indeed, if the retailer wants to market a quantity 1ˆx x , he could set-up without cost 1e e( x )  at stage I of 
the game.  
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For a given quantity, the intermediary price is an increasing function of the standard. 
Moreover, the existence of a unique intermediary price generates a positive externality for the 
producers, whose equipment is higher than the lowest equipment level e . 
The average risk that the supply chain fails to provide safe products in the final market 
takes a different form with respect to that obtained in the benchmark25: 
 
1
e
1
1
1 1
1 1 1
e1
( e ) f ( e )de if e e
1( e ,x )
1 e
( e ) f ( e )de e e ( e ) if e e


 
      


  
 (10) 
If no investments are made, 1e e , the risk simply corresponds to the average risk of 
suppliers located between e and 1 (without change in the initial level of equipment). If 
investments are made, 1e e , suppliers’ equipments will be distributed on 1[ e ,1] with a 
Dirac mass at 1e (i.e., all producers initially located between e  and 1e  invest in order to 
adopt the same level of equipment, 1e ). 
Using (3) and (10), we then obtain: 
1
1 1
1 1 1
x ˆif x x
2J( e ,x )
J ˆ( 1 e )[ 1 ( 1 e )] if x x
2x

      
 (11) 
The expression (11) shows the existence of a quantity/quality trade-off for the retailer 
in the following sense. For a given standard 1e , the risk is an increasing function of the 
quantity because an increase of quantity implicitly implies the involvement of a higher 
number of under-equipped producers. Moreover, for a given quantity x, the risk decreases in 
1e , as long as the retailer’s strategy leads to an improvement of upstream supply 
characteristics, i.e. when 1ˆx x . 
For a given standard 1e  and a given quantity x, the retailer’s expected profit 1 1(e ,x)  is 
the following, 
1 1 1 1 1 1( e ,x ) [ p( ( e ,x ),x ) ( e ,x )]x     (12)  
Where the risk 1 1( e , x )  is given by (11). The intermediary price 1 1( e ,x ) is given by 
(9) and the final price 1 1p( (e ,x),x)  is obtained by substituting (11) into (2). 
For a given standard, the quantity choice affects the expected profit in two ways: (i) the 
lower the quantity, the lower the intermediary price; (ii) the lower the quantity, the higher the 
final price. This second effect is due to the direct “rarity effect” and to an indirect risk-
reducing effect of a decrease of quantity. Note that consumer misperception affects the extent 
of the indirect effect. 
Using (12), we then maximize the expected profit 1 1(e ,x)  with respect to the quantity 
x, given 1e . We show in the Appendix, that for any level of  and given the private standard 
1e , the optimal quantity *1 1x ( e )  chosen by the retailer is given by:  
                                                 
25 Taking into account that in the case of private standard the selection of upstream producers is always done by 
selection the most effective ones (selection from the right to the left on the interval [0,1]). 
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1 1 1
*
1 1 1
1
ˆ ˆx J [1 e ] if e e( )
x ( e ) [ ( 1 e )( 1 )] ˆJ if e e( )
2( J 1)

  
        
 (13) 
Where eˆ( )  is given by (8). 
We can easily verify that *1 1x ( e )  is continuous in 1e . The threshold of equipment 
eˆ( )  identifies the relative position of this optimal quantity with respect to 1xˆ . By 
comparing *1 1x ( e )  to 1xˆ  we highlight in Proposition 1 the influence of the private standard 
1e  on the retailer’s procurement strategy. 
Proposition 1 
If 1 ˆe e( ) , the retailer selects all the initially well-equipped producers using a pure 
selection strategy, and quantity decreases in 1e . If 1 ˆe e( ) , the retailer also involves some 
initially not well-equipped producers using a proactive strategy. Quantity decreases in 1e  
when consumers underestimate the risk and increases in 1e  when consumers overestimate the 
risk. In the absence of consumer misperception the optimal procurement is constant in 1e . 
Proof : see Appendix 
Let us consider in figure 1 the influence of the private standard on the retailer’s quantity 
strategy and for different levels of risk misperceptions. When the private standard is 
relatively weak ( 1 ˆe e( ) ), the retailer adopts a pure selection strategy, selecting 1ˆx x  at a 
zero intermediary price, regardless of the level of risk misperception. Hence, when 1e  
increases in this context, the retailer prefers to reduce the quantity (and increase the final 
price via the rarity effect) rather than remunerating the equipments’ upgrading of some 
initially not well-equipped producers. When the private standard is relatively strict 
( 1 ˆe e( ) ), the retailer also involves some initially not well-equipped producers in order to 
implement his optimal procurement strategy. For a given quantity x, a stricter standard 
implies an increased unitary procurement cost (intermediary price) for the retailer. If the 
standard increases in this context, the retailer could thus have interest in decreasing quantity. 
However, for a given quantity x, a stricter standard implies a reduced risk of product failure 
and thus an enhanced consumer demand. The retailer could then have interest in increasing 
quantity. 
Consumer misperception plays a crucial role in the following sense. While it does not 
affect the intermediary price-increasing effect of the standard, it influences consumers’ 
reaction (in terms of WTP) to the risk-reducing effect. More specifically, for a given quantity 
x, the higher consumer misperception the higher the perceived risk-reduction (and the WTP 
improvement) effect of the standard. Hence, if consumers underestimate the risk ( 1  ), the 
retailer decreases quantity in order to reinforce the risk-reducing effect and mitigate the 
intermediary price-increasing effect. It is worthy to notice that if consumers correctly 
perceive the actual risk level ( 1  ), the risk-reducing effect balances the intermediary price-
increasing effect; as a consequence, the quantity is constant in the standard. Conversely, if 
consumers overestimate the risk ( 1  ), the WTP improvement is more important than the 
increase of the intermediary price, for a given quantity. Since the increase in the marginal 
 14
benefit exceeds the increase in the marginal cost, the retailer responds to an increase of the 
standard with an increase of the supplied quantity, at a higher intermediary price. 
 
1
*
1x (e )
1 
1 
1eeˆ( 1) eˆ( 1)
1xˆ
1 
eˆ( 1)0 1
J
 
figure 1. Retailer’s quantity choice, according to the private standard level and for different levels of 
consumers’ misperception. 
 
Effect of the standard level on the risk 
An increase of the marketed quantity implies an increase of the sanitary risk, for a 
given level of standard (as it results in the involvement of an increasing number of 
underequipped producers). Nevertheless, as shown in the previous section, this increase of 
quantity may be related to a reinforcement of the standard and thus imply a trade-off in the 
assessment of the actual level of sanitary risk on the final market. In the following 
Proposition 2, we show that the consequences of the retailer’s strategy on the risk are 
ambiguous. 
 
Proposition 2 
If 1 ˆe e( ) , the risk decreases in 1e . If 1 ˆe e( ) , the risk decreases in 1e  when consumers 
underestimate (or correctly perceive) the risk and may increase in 1e  when consumers 
overestimate the risk. 
Proof : see Appendix 
The figure 2 shows the influence of the private standard 1e  on the 
risk *1 1 1 1 1(e ) (e ,x (e ))  . As long as 1 ˆe e( ) , the risk decreases in 1e  through the 
decrease of quantity. It is worthy to notice that if 1e 0  the risk is given by 1(0 ) .5  , that 
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corresponds to the average risk when all upstream producers are selected with their initial 
equipments ( ˆx x J  i.e. e 0 ). If 1 ˆe e( ) , the retailer’s strategic behaviour affects the 
risk in the following sense. If consumers underestimate or correctly perceive the risk ( 1  ), 
the risk decreases, as a result of the increase of the standard, while quantity decreases (if 
1  ) or is constant (if 1  ) in 1e . Conversely, if consumers overestimate the risk ( 1  ), 
quantity increases in the standard (Proposition 1). As long as the risk-increasing effect of the 
increase of quantity dominates the risk-reducing effect of the standard’s reinforcement, the 
risk of product failure increases in the standard26. The risk has thus a local maximum on the 
interval ˆ[e( ),1] , given by e( )  in figure 2 (see the Appendix for details) and two levels of 
standard could exist whereby the same risk arises, i.e. the same probability of product success 
may be achieved by implementing the higher of these two levels of standard (which 
corresponds to the highest level of quantity supplied on the market, e.g. 1  in figure 2). 
11(e )
1e
eˆ( 1)eˆ( 1)
1
1
0 1
.5
e( )
1
 
figure 2. Risk of product failure according to the private standard level and for different levels of 
consumers’ misperception. 
                                                 
26 The possible quality-reducing effect of a standard has been widely illustrated by the literature on MQS, but 
without vertical relationships considerations. See for example Scarpa (1998) who shows that if a MQS is 
introduced in a vertically differentiated market with three retailers, then the maximum quality level, the average 
quality consumed as well as the profit levels of all retailers decrease. In this spirit, Maxwell (1998) illustrates 
that a MQS may reduce retailer incentives to innovate – when the innovating retailer correctly anticipates that a 
regulator will raise the minimum standard once an innovation has been discovered – leading to a lower level of 
social welfare under regulation. Furthermore, the introduction of “innocuous” minimum quality standards, 
namely below the lowest quality level in a market, may reduce the incentive to invest in R&D by the quality-
leading retailer (Garella, 2006). 
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3. Retailer’s normalization strategy 
We detail now at which conditions the retailer has interest in reinforcing the MQS with 
a more demanding private standard (stage I of the game). We denote by *1 0e ( e )  the optimal 
decision of the retailer, when he chooses the level of the private standard, according to the 
level 0e  of the MQS. This decision is made by anticipating the optimal procurement strategy 
vis-à-vis upstream suppliers (described in the previous section).Since we assume no fixed 
cost for the implementation of a private standard more demanding than the MQS at stage I, 
the retailer’s profit, when he chooses the level of the private standard, according to the level 
of the MQS, is higher than the retailer’s profit in the benchmark ( *1 1 0 0 0( e ( e )) ( e )  ), when 
the retailer reinforces the MQS with a more demanding private standard ( *1 0 0e ( e ) e ) and 
equal ( *1 0 0( e ( e )) ( e )  ) when the retailer simply complies with the MQS ( *1 0 0e ( e ) e ), for 
each positive level of  ; whilst for 0   we always have *1 0 0( e ( e )) ( e )   (see Appendix 
for details). 
Figure 3 illustrates the retailer’s profit as a function of the private standard 1e  and for 
three situations of consumer misperception. For each of these situations, the first part of the 
curve (in bold characters) corresponds to the pure selection strategy, while the second one (in 
fine characters) corresponds to the proactive strategy.27 Two possible optima are thus 
conceivable according to different configurations, on the one hand the implementation of the 
most demanding standard with a proactive strategy, on the other hand a less demanding 
standard with a simple selection of suppliers. We show in the Appendix that this latter case 
arises for the local maximum e( ) given by: 
e( ) 1
2J
     (14) 
● In the situation (1) of figure 3, consumers underestimate (or correctly perceive) the 
risk ( 1  ) and the retailer’s profit has a unique maximum here illustrated by the value  1e . 
In this case, the retailer prefers adopting a relatively weak level of standard by implementing 
the pure selection strategy. Consequently, if the public standard 0e  is lower than  1e , then 
the retailer adopts this strategy by reinforcing the public standard, and 
chooses  *1 0 1e ( e ) e . Inversely, if the public standard is such that  0 1e e , then the 
retailer does not implement a more demanding private standard and chooses *1 0 0e ( e ) e . 
● In the situation (2) of figure 3, consumers do not overestimate too much the risk 
(1 2  ) and the pure selection strategy makes it again possible for the retailer to obtain the 
best profit for  *1 0 2e ( e ) e . However, the proactive strategy admits a local minimum 
between  2e  and 1e 1 . Then, there exists a threshold e( )  such that the retailer’s profit 
is the same for this level of standard and the level 1e 1 . 
                                                 
27 The proactive strategy is implemented starting from the threshold eˆ( ) that we did not represent in order to 
assure a better readability of figure 3. 
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2 ( 1 )1 if 1 U
1 ( 2 J )
e ( )
4( J 1 ) 8( J 1 )( 2 )
1 [ ] if U 2
4( J 1 )( 2 J )
   

 
               
 (15) 
where U ( J 1)( J 3 ) J    , with 1 U 2  . 
In the figure 3, e( ) is represented by  2e in the situation (2). If the public standard 
0e  is such that  0 2e e , then the retailer adopts the pure selection strategy and reinforces 
the public standard by choosing  *1 0 2e ( e ) e  (situation (2a)). If the public standard is such 
that    02 2e e e  , then the retailer does not implement a more demanding private 
standard and chooses *1 0 0e ( e ) e . If the public standard is such that   02e e 1  , then the 
retailer reinforces the MQS, by choosing *1 0e (e ) 1  (situation (2b)). Highly constrained by 
the MQS in his procurement strategy, the retailer implements the risk-minimizing private 
standard in order to increase quantity. 
● In the situation (3) of figure 3, consumers overestimate the risk even more ( 2  ). 
The profit curve is similar to that of the previous situation, but the maximum profit is 
achieved for the standard 1e 1 . Consequently, for every 00 e 1  , the retailer reinforces 
the public standard, choosing *1 0e (e ) 1 . 
1 1(e )
1e0 1
1 
2 
1 2 
(1)
(2)
(3)
2J
4(J 1)


Possible optimum 
with pure selection 
strategy
Possible optimum 
with proactive 
strategy
 1e  2e 2e  
 “Pure selection strategy”: 1ˆx x  and 1 1e(e ) e  
“Proactive strategy”: 1ˆx x  and 1 1e(e ) e  
figure 3. Retailers’ profit according to the private standard and for different levels of 
consumers’ misperception 
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The following proposition 3 summarizes these results. 
 
Proposition 3 
When 1   , the retailer sets a private standard more demanding than the MQS iff 
0e e( ) . When 1 2   , the retailer sets a private standard more demanding than the 
MQS iff 0e e( )  or 0e ( ) e 1   . When 2  , the retailer sets a private standard more 
demanding than the MQS for every 00 e 1  . 
Proof : see Appendix 
Hence, we have shown that the level of consumer misperception could explain the 
retailer’s decision and that it is not necessarily when the MQS is relatively weak that the 
retailer has interest in implementing a more demanding private standard. Moreover, it appears 
(see appendix for details) that the normalization strategy may be developed in different ways 
according to whether it corresponds to a simply selection of suppliers or to a proactive role of 
the retailer in encouraging investments towards an improvement of food safety (such that the 
retailer supports the compliance of upstream suppliers to a more demanding private 
standard). The choice of the type of strategy depends on both the level of MQS and, above 
all, on the level of consumer misperception. When the consumers correctly perceive or 
underestimate the risk, the retailer never implements a more demanding standard than the 
MQS with a proactive strategy. This strategy is implemented only if consumers highly 
overestimate the risk, regardless of the level of MQS, or if consumers moderately 
overestimate the risk and the MQS is relatively strict. 
4. Effectiveness for upstream producers and consumers 
This section examines the positive and negative externalities of private standards for 
upstream producers and consumers. We first analyze the effects of raising the standard 1e  
and then the effectiveness of the private standard, with respect to the benchmark, for both 
producers and consumers. For the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, we 
restraint the analysis to the case in which consumer risk overestimation is not too high (i.e. to 
situations (1) and (2) previously identified in section 3), taking 2  . 
 
Effectiveness for producers 
We first consider the effects of the standard on producer market access, this latter 
measured by x/J, i.e. the proportion of producers involved in the intermediary market. 
When 1 ˆe e( ) , the retailer exactly selects all the initially well-equipped producers at a zero 
intermediary price. In this context, since quantity decreases in 1e  (as shown in figure 1), 
market access gets worse. When 1 ˆe e( ) and consumers underestimate the risk ( 1  ) the 
same result holds. It is worthy to notice that when there is no risk misperception ( 1  ), 
raising the standard does not affect market access. However, if consumers overestimate the 
risk ( 1  ), raising the private standard improves market access (as a result of the incentive 
for the retailer to increase quantity). Moreover, producers are also better-off in terms of 
intermediary price, this latter increasing in 1e . 
The most interesting issue is to look at the optimum of the retailer’s normalization 
strategy. We show in the appendix that when the retailer implements a private standard with 
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pure selection strategy ( 1e e( ) when 0e e( ) ), the quantities commercialized by the 
retailer (and ordered from upstream producers) are lower than in the benchmark. An 
exclusion effect thus arises without an improved remuneration of producers who supply the 
intermediary market. Inversely, when the retailer implements a proactive strategy 
( 1e 1 when 0e e ( ) ), in the presence of a risk overestimation by consumers, 
commercialized quantities are higher than in the benchmark with moreover a higher profit of 
upstream producers. Hence, the sanitary risk reduction at its minimum level, which leads 
consumers to increase the demand on the final market, may also be optimal for producers. 
 
Effectiveness for consumers 
From the point of view of consumers, we consider two criteria to characterize the 
effectiveness of the private standard. On the one hand, the actual sanitary risk (measured by 
1 ) and on the other hand, the surplus that makes it possible to measure consumer 
“satisfaction” toward product characteristics (by taking into account the perceived risk and 
the price of the final product).28The main results in the appendix are the following.Taking 
into account the role of risk misperception, we show that raising the standard may benefit 
consumers both in terms of actual risk reduction and surplus improvement. When 1 ˆe e( ) , 
and regardless of the level of  , raising the standard reduces the risk but at the same time 
worsens consumer surplus. The reduction of consumer surplus is explained by the decrease of 
quantity and the increase of final price (this latter increasing through the rarity effect and the 
risk reduction), in a context where raising the standard has no WTP-effect (i.e., for a given 
quantity x, the risk is not affected by the level of standard). When 1 ˆe e( )  and consumers 
underestimate (or correctly perceive) the risk ( 1  ), raising the standard reduces the risk 
and at the same time may improve consumers’ surplus. More specifically, the surplus 
increases in this context when the WTP effect is non negligible ( 1    see appendix for 
details) and as long as it dominates the decrease of quantity (and the increase of final price), 
i.e. for relatively low levels of standard in this context. However, if consumers overestimate 
the risk ( 1  ), raising the standard implies an increase of quantity (proposition 1) and 
improves WTP more than proportionally than the actual risk reduction); final price has an 
initially decreasing trait (when the standard is relatively low) and then increases in the 
standard (see appendix for details). In this context, the effect of the standard on consumer 
surplus thus results from the interaction between the negative effect of an increase of final 
price and the positive effect of both the quantity and the WTP-effect. Surplus thus increases 
when the increase of quantity and the WTP-effect dominates the price effect. The WTP-effect 
is shown to be amplified by the level of   so that, for a sufficiently high level of  , 
consumer surplus increases in the standard and achieves its maximum level 1e 1 . It is 
worthy to notice that, if consumers overestimate the risk, the contrasting effect may arise 
whereby raising the standard improves consumer surplus, but increases the actual risk, 
notably when the standard increases but remains lower than the threshold e (Proposition 2) 
so that the related risk-reducing effect is dominated by the risk-increasing effect of the 
increase of quantity. 
We now analyze the effects of the private standard on consumer surplus with respect to 
the benchmark. This analysis is particularly tedious from the analytical point of view, given 
                                                 
28Using (2), (7) and (10), we obtain consumers’ surplus 1S(e ) , for a given standard 1e  (see Appendix for 
details). 
 20
the multiplicity of the above mentioned effects. We have to compare the levels of consumer 
surplus (in the private standard and in the benchmark situation) for each level of MQS 0e . 
We provide in the appendix the results of this analytical comparison. However, for the sake 
of reading simplicity, let us now focus on the most symptomatic result obtained in the 
situation (2), taking into account the particular case of risk misperception 7 5  . Figure 4 
represents the benchmark consumer surplus (dotted line) and the consumer surplus arising 
when the retailer may implement the private standard * )1 0e (e  (in bold line) as functions of the 
MQS 0e . 
Benchmark 
surplus
0e0 1e
0S(e )
“pure
selection”
strategy
“proactive”
strategy
e 0ˆe
2 2
2
J
8(J 1)


No private 
Standard
*
1e e
*
1e 1
21( )8 2

2J
2
 
figure 4. Effectiveness of the private standard for consumers, taking 7 5   
When the retailer implements a private standard with pure selection strategy 
( 1e e( ) when 0e e( ) ), consumer surplus is always worsen with respect to the 
benchmark as a result of the decrease of quantities (see proof in the appendix). Inversely, 
when the retailer implements a proactive strategy ( 1e 1 when 0e e ( ) ), consumer surplus 
may be higher than in the benchmark. In the particular case represented in Figure 4, and for 
the above mentioned contrasting effects of quantity, price and WTP-effect, the benchmark 
surplus adopts a sinusoidal shape for 0 ˆe e( ) . In the case the retailer may set a private 
standard, the implementation of the maximum level of standard implies a discontinuity in 
e( )  whereby, in this particular case, we have 1 0S ( e( )) S ( e( ))  . Hence, the private 
standard with proactive strategy improves consumer surplus with respect to the benchmark, 
when the MQS is higher than the level 0eˆ  (see the appendix for details). 
The following proposition 4 summarizes the results illustrated in this section. 
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Proposition 4 
Considering the cases where the retailer set-up a private standard more demanding than the 
MQS, we obtain the following results. If the private standard corresponds to a pure selection 
strategy ( 1e e( ) ) then the private standard always reduces the market access for 
upstream producer and it also reduces consumer surplus. If the private standard corresponds 
to a proactive strategy ( 1e 1 ) then the private standard always improve the market access 
for upstream producers and may also improve consumer surplus, while the risk is minimized. 
Proof : see Appendix 
Synthesizing the results, we have shown that a retail-led strengthening of market access 
conditions does not necessarily deteriorate the market access for upstream producers. This 
result notably arises, even if the MQS is relatively high, when the retailer implements a 
proactive strategy under the “market-incentive” of consumer risk overestimation. In addition, 
risk overestimation appears to be crucial in determining the private standard effectiveness for 
consumers: the more consumers overestimate the risk, the higher is the private standard 
effectiveness for consumers, even if the MQS is relatively high. The situation may thus arise 
whereby the private standard may be effective for both sides of the market, consumers and 
upstream producers. 
 
Conclusion 
Our paper provides an original contribution as we explicitly consider how both public 
and private policies are affected by consumers’ information about the average quality 
provided on the market.  
We have studied the incentive for the retailer to develop private standards, more 
constraining that the minimum quality standard set by the public authority, in a context where 
product’s attributes are signalled to consumers (either by the retailer or by third parties) 
through a communication based on the product’s average quality. We have shown that when 
consumer risk perception is sufficiently high, and even if the MQS is relatively severe, the 
retailer has interest in developing a more constraining private standard, in order to benefit 
from the improvement of willingness to pay and thus increase the supplied quantity. Further, 
we have analyzed the conditions for the effectiveness of private standards for producers and 
consumers. As for the impact of private standards on producers, we have shown that the 
retailers’ normalization strategy may favour an upgrading of upstream production conditions 
and, at the same time, an improvement of upstream producers market access. As for the 
impact of private standards on consumers, we have shown that setting a private standard may, 
at the same time, improve food safety and consumer surplus. 
Empirical evidence shows an increasing use of global business to business (B2B) 
standards, which are not communicated directly to consumers, in procurement from suppliers 
and as a governance tool in the food system. In general, investments in quality or quality 
control mechanisms are seen as a way to build consumer trust and increase the value of a 
retailer’s reputation, once signalled to consumers. But why do retailers exceed the legal 
MQS, when quality signals are not transmitted to consumers, such as use of EurepGap, or 
GFSI standards? Some reasons may be put forward. At first, providing consumers with 
products that meet consistent quality and safety standards that go beyond the minimum 
requirements builds reputation, the key asset for current and future earnings flows (Fulponi, 
2006). Secondly, major processors and retailers implement private standards as instruments 
for the coordination of supply chains by standardizing product requirements over suppliers 
(Henson and Reardon, 2005). This becomes of greater importance as supply chains become 
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more global and cut across differing regulatory, economic and regulatory environments. 
Private standards may thus be implemented in order to reduce the transaction costs and risks 
associated with procurement. Thirdly, retailers may be prompted to develop private standards 
in order to limit exposure to potential regulatory action and/or anticipate future regulatory 
developments (Lutz et al., 2000) and manage exposure to liability. Our analysis could thus be 
extended by considering that the public authority jointly uses ex-ante regulation (MQS) and 
ex-post liability rules. The existence of an expected sanction associated with product’s failure 
and the consequently risk of market share erosion in the long term is thus likely to incentive 
retailers to implement private standards, even if they are not signalled to consumers (Fulponi, 
2006, Henson, 2006).  
Moreover, in this paper we explicitly takes into account the dimension of vertical 
relationships, by considering that the MQS is applied to the upstream retailers, whereas the 
downstream retailer maintains the strategic flexibility to choose both quantity and quality, 
given that the upstream supply complies with the MQS. Hence, empirical evidence shows 
that MQS often concern intermediate products29. In a context where the risk arises both from 
the upstream production conditions and from the strategic behaviour of the downstream 
retailer, the MQS may have different effects whether it is applied to the upstream suppliers or 
to the downstream retailer. This extends our analysis in the larger debate about the optimal 
public policy between “obligation of means” and “obligation of results”. In the latter case, the 
MQS is applied to the downstream retailer, which is thus constrained in the quality-quantity 
choice by a level of average quality fixed by the public authority. The question raised is thus 
whether the retailer has interest in developing a private standard and which are the effects of 
the different policy instruments on social welfare. 
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Appendix 
Benchmark 
By using (2)-(6) we determine the retailer’s expected profit for a given standard 0e  and a 
given quantity x, 
2 0
0
0 0
2 2
0 0 0
(1 e ) ˆx [ ]x if x x
2(e ,x)
J 1 J ˆx [ (1 e )(1 )]x (1 e ) if x x2J
 

  
           
 (A1) 
For 0ˆx x  the first order condition gives the expression 00 (1 e )1x(e ) [ ]2 2 
  ; we verify 
that 0 0 0ˆx( e ) x J(1 e )   iff 0e e ( )  with e ( )  given by (8). For 0ˆx x  the first order 
condition gives the expression 0 0
Jx(e ) ( ,e )
J 1
    where (.,.)  is defined by the following, 
0 0
1( ,e ) [ ( 1 e )( 1 )]
2
        (A2) 
In this case we verify ex-post that 0 0 0ˆx( e ) x J(1 e )   iff 0 ˆe e( )  with eˆ( ) given by 
(8). 
Using (8) we easily verify that ˆe ( ) e( )    for each 0  . The optimal quantity *0 0x ( e )  is 
then given by (7). The continuity of this optimal quantity (and of all benchmark expressions) 
in 0e  is demonstrated noting that 
1 [ (1 e ( ))] J(1 e ( ))
2 2
        
and ˆ ˆ( ,e( )) (J 1)(1 e( ))      . 
By using (3) we easily verify the following. When 0e e ( ) and 0  , *0 0x ( e ) does not 
depend of 0e ; when 0e e ( )  and 0  , *0 0x ( e )  increases in 0e . When 
0 ˆe ( ) e e( )    *0 0x ( e )  decreases in 0e . When 0 ˆe e( ) , (i) if 1  , *0 0x ( e )  decreases in 
0e ; (ii) if 1  , *0 0x ( e ) does not depend of 0e  and (iii) if 1  , *0 0x ( e ) increases in 0e . 
Optimal procurement and risk of product failure 
By using (2), (9), (11) and (12), we determine the retailer’s expected profit 1 1( e ,x )  as a 
function of the standard 1e and for the quantity 1ˆx x : 
2 2
1 1 1 1
J 1 J(e ,x) x [ (1 e )(1 )]x (1 e )2J
           (A3) 
The first order condition gives the expression 1 1
Jx(e ) ( ,e )
J 1
    with 1( ,e )  defined by 
(A2). We then verify ex-post that 1 1 1ˆx( e ) x J(1 e )    if and only if 1 ˆe e( )  with 
eˆ( ) given by (8).The optimal quantity *1 1x ( e )  is then given by (13).We verify the 
continuity noting 
1 ˆ ˆ( ,e( )) 1 e( )
J 1
     . 
By using (3) and (13) we determine 1e( e ) : 
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1 1
*
1 1 1
1 1
ˆe if e e( )
e( e ) e( e ,x ( e )) 1 ˆ1 ( ,e ) if e e( )
J 1

  
     
   (A4) 
By using (11) and (13) (knowing that we always have 1ˆx x ), we determine the risk 
*
1 1 1 1 1 1( e ) ( e ,x ( e ))  : 
1 1
1 1
1 1 1
1
1 ˆ(1 e ) if e e( )
2
( e )
J 1 ˆ(1 e )[1 (1 e )] if e e( )
2 ( ,e )


 
        
 (A5) 
By using (9) and (13), we determine the intermediary price *1 1 1 1 1( e ) ( e ,x ( e ))  : 
1
1 1
1 1 1
ˆ0 if e e( )
( e ) 1 ˆ( ,e ) (1 e ) if e e( )
J 1

   
     
 (A6) 
By using (2), (A5) and (13), we determine the final price *1 1 1 1p(e ) p(e ,x (e )) : 
1 1
1
1
1 1 1 1
1
1 ˆ(1 e )( 2J ) if e e( )
2
p( e )
(1 e )( J 1) 2 J ˆ[ ( ,e ) (1 e )] ( ,e ) if e e( )
2 ( ,e ) J 1 J 1
  
      
              
 (A7) 
When 1 ˆe e( ) , the price 1p( e )  is an increasing function of 1e . Consequently, 
since J
2
    , 1p( e )  is always positive. When 1 ˆe e( ) , then: (i) if 1  , the price 
1p( e )  increases in 1e , (ii) if 1  , the price 1p( e )  has a local minimum on the interval 
ˆ[e( ),1] , given by: 
2 ( J 1 )e( ) 1
1 ( 1 ) ( J 2 )( 2J ) J
     
      
  (A8) 
By substituting (A8) into (A7), we easily verify that p( e( )) 0  . We also verify that 
1 ˆp( e 1) p( e( ))  . 
Proof of Proposition 1  
By using (13), we easily verify the following. When 1 ˆe e( ) , )1 1e(e e  and the optimal 
quantity *1 1 1x ( e ) J(1 e )   decreases in 1e .When 1 ˆe e( ) , then: (i) if 1  , the optimal 
quantity *1 1x ( e )  decreases in 1e , (ii) if 1  , the optimal quantity *1 1 Jx ( e ) 2( J 1)
   does 
not depend of 1e , (iii) if 1  , the optimal quantity *1 1x ( e )  increases in 1e . 
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Proof of Proposition 2 
When 1 ˆe e( ) , by using (A5) we easily verify that the risk 1 1(e ) decreases in 1e . When 
1 ˆe e( ) , by using (A5) we calculate 1 1 1(e ) e  and we verify that: (i) if 1  , 
1 1 1( e ) e 0   on the interval ˆ[e( ),1] , (ii) if 1  , there exists a local maximum e( )  on 
the interval ˆ[e( ),1] , such that the risk increases from eˆ( ) to e( )  and decreases from 
e( )  to 1  ( 1 1 1( e ) e 0 e e( )       ), with e( )  given by: 
( J ) ( J 1 )( J )
e( ) 1 [ ]
( J )( 1 )
    
      
  (A9) 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Using (12), (13) and (A5)-(A7), we determine the retailer’s profit *1 1 1 1 1 1( e ) ( e ,x ( e ))   as a 
function of the standard 1e : 
2
1 1 1
1 1
2 2
1 1 1
J ˆ( 2J )(1 e ) J(1 e ) if e e( )
2
( e )
J J ˆ[ ( ,e )] (1 e ) if e e( )
( J 1) 2
  

   
          
 (A10) 
When 1 ˆe e( )  the profit s(e )  has a local maximum on the interval ˆ[0,e( )]  given by 
e( ) , such that 1 1 1 1(e ) e 0 e e( )      , with e( ) given by (14). We verify that we 
always have ˆe( ) e( )  and that e( ) 0  iff 2J   .When 1 ˆe e( ) , we verify that 
1 1 1 1( e ) e 0 e e( )      , with e( ) given by: 
2
( 1 )e( ) 1
( 1) 2 ( J 1)
   
    
  (A11) 
We easily verify that ˆe( ) e( )  and e( ) 1   iff 1  . Hence, if 1  , the profit 
1 1(e ) decreases in 1e  on the interval ˆ[e( ),1] , and if 1  , the profit 1 1(e ) has a local 
minimum e( )  on the interval ˆ[e( ),1] , such that the profit decreases from eˆ( )  to e( )  
and increases from e( )  to 1 . By using (A10) and (14) we verify that 
1 1( e 1) ( e( ))    iff 2  .The result of these calculations allows us to distinguish the 
following cases according to the level of  : 
(1) When 1   the profit 1 1( e )  has a local maximum on ˆ[0,e( )]  given by e( )  and 
decreases in 1e on ˆ[e( ),1] . The retailer’s optimal standard’s choice *1 0e ( e ) is then given 
by: 
0*
1 0
0 0
e( ) if e e( )
e ( e )
e if e e( )
 

  
 (A12) 
(2) When 1 2   the profit 1 1( e )  has a local maximum on ˆ[0,e( )]  given by e( )  
and a local minimum e( ) on the interval ˆ[e( ),1]  given by (A11). In addition, we know 
that in this case 1 1( e 1) ( e( ))    . We have thus to compare 1 1( e 1)   with 1( e )  on 
the interval [e( ),1] , by distinguishing according to the relative position of 1e  with respect 
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to eˆ( ) . We first verify that 1 1 ˆ( e 1) ( e( )) U       , with U ( J 1)( J 3 ) J     
(and 1 U 2  ). Then, we verify that there exists e( ) [e( ),1]   given by: 
2 ( 1 )1 if 1 U1 ( 2J )
e( )
4( J 1 ) 8( J 1 )( 2 )1 [ ] if U 24( J 1 )( 2J )
   

 

   

      
 (A13) 
whereby 1 1 1 1( e 1) ( e )    iff 1e e( ) , with e ( )  decreasing in  . More specifically, if 
1 U  , then eˆ( ) e( ) 1    and if U 2  , then ˆe( ) e( ) e( )    . The retailer’s 
optimal standard’s choice *1 0e ( e )  is given by: 
0
*
1 0 0 0
0
e( ) if e e( )
e ( e ) e if e( ) e e( )
1 if e e( )
 
 

   
 (A14) 
(3) When 2   the profit 1 1( e )  has a local maximum on ˆ[0,e( )]  given by e( )  and 
is maximised with 1e 1 . 
Finally, we verify that *1 1 0 1 0( e ( e )) ( e )  .Using (A10) and according to the three cases 
detailed in Proposition 3, we easily calculate the profit *1 1 0( e (e )) . 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Given the conditions on   and 0e  whereby the retailer sets a private standard as detailed in 
Proposition 3, we now determine the effects on market access, consumer surplus, and risk. 
Effect on market access 
The benchmark quantity *0 0x ( e )  is given by (7). 
(i) Private standard with pure selection strategy(when 0e e( ) ). 
By using (13), we verify that the quantity * *1 1 0x ( e ( e ))  is given by 
* *
1 1 0x ( e ( e )) J [1 e( )]  . Given that * * *1 1 0 0 0x ( e ( e )) x ( e 0 )   (under 
hypothesis J 2   ), we verify that * * *1 1 0 0 0x ( e ( e )) x ( e )  for each level of 0e whereby 
0e e( ) . 
(ii) Private standard with proactive strategy(when 0e( ) e 1   ). 
By using (13), we verify that the quantity * *1 1 0x ( e ( e ))  is given by * *1 1 0
Jx ( e ( e ))
2( J 1)
  . 
By using (7), we obtain * * *1 1 0 0 0x ( e ( e )) x ( e )  for each level of 0e whereby 0e( ) e 1   . 
Effect on consumer surplus 
For a given standard se , and a quantity x supplied by the retailer, the consumer surplus 
sS( e ,x )  is given by: 
x
0
s xˆ x
ˆ0 x
ˆp( t )dt p( x )x if x x
S( e ,x )
ˆp( t )dt p( t )dt p( x )x if x x
      

 
 (A15) 
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with sxˆ J(1 e )  . 
For the benchmark situation, p( x) is obtained by substituting (5) into (2) according to the 
position of x with respect to 0xˆ . By using (A15), we then obtain 
2
0S(e ,x ) x / 2  if 
0ˆx x and if  0ˆx x  we find the following,  
2
0 0
0
0
ˆx ( 1 e )x xS( e ,x ) ln( )
ˆ2 2 x
    (A16) 
By substituting (7)into (A16), we calculate the benchmark consumer surplus as a function of 
the standard 0e ,
*
0 0 0 )0S ( e ) S( e ,x ( e ) :  
20
0
2
0
0 0 0
2
20 0
0 0
0
1 ( 1 e )[ ] if e e ( )
8 2
xˆ ˆS ( e ) if e ( ) e e( )
2
y( e ) J y( e ) ˆ( 1 e ) ln( ) if e e( )
ˆ2 2 x
  
 
 


       
 (A17) 
Where: 0 0 0
J Jy(e ) ( ,e ) [ (1 e )(1 )]
J 1 2( J 1)
         . 
Hence, 0 0S ( e ) is an increasing function of e0 on [0,e ( )] (for 0  ) and a decreasing 
function of e0 on ˆ[e ( ),e( )]  . 
The suite of the demonstration is analytically particularly complex and we have used 
simulations to verify the effects announced for specific values of the parameters. 
Posing J 100 and 180  (consistent with the frame of hypothesis J 2 2J    ), it 
appears that as   is greater than ˆ 1.90  (with ˆ 1.90 U( J 100 )    ) then 0 0S ( e ) is an 
increasing function of e0 on ˆ[ e( ),1] . When   is less than ˆ we distinguish the following 
cases: 
- If ˆ1.60 1.90       then 0 0S ( e )admits a local maximum and a local minimum 
on ˆ]e( ),1[ with maximum surplus achieved for 0e 1 . 
- If 1 1.60     then 0 0S ( e )  adopts a sinusoidal shapeon ˆ]e( ),1[ . Therefore 
0 0S ( e )admits a local maximum and a local minimum along the interval ˆ]e( ),1[ with 
maximum surplus achieved between eˆ( )  and 1. 
- If 0.55 1     then 0 0S ( e )  admits a local maximum along the interval 
ˆ]e( ),1[ with maximum surplus achieved between eˆ( )  and 1. 
- If   is less than 0.55   then 0 0S ( e )  decreases on ˆ[ e( ),1] . 
For the situation of private standard, p( x) is obtained by substituting (11) into (2). 
Knowing that in this case we always have 1ˆx x , we obtain an equation similar to (A16), 
only by substituting 0xˆ  by 1xˆ . We then write the consumer surplus as a function of the 
standard 1e , and using (A14), we obtain the expected consumer surplus in the case of private 
standard * * *( ) ( )1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0S (e ) S (e e ,x (e e )) . We distinguish two cases according to the level of 
  with respect to U (i.e. to the relative position of e( )  with respect to eˆ( ) ): 
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-If 1 U   (then eˆ( ) e( ) 1   ), consumer surplus 1 0S ( e )is given by: 
2
0
2
0
0
1 0 2
0 02
0 0
0
2 2
02
[ J(1 e( ))] if e e( )
2
xˆ ˆif e( ) e e( )
2
S ( e )
y( e ) y( e )J ˆ(1 e ) ln( ) if e( ) e e( )
ˆ2 2 x
J if e e( )
8( J 1)
 
 
  
 
         
 (A18) 
Hence, 1 0S ( e ) is constant on [ 0,e( )]  and a decreasing function of e0 on ˆ[ e( ),e( )]  . 
Using the same simulation values as previously illustrated, we verify that 1 0S ( e )increases in 
0e  (or has a local maximum) on ˆ[ e( ),e ( )]  and then is constant on [ e( ),1] . Note that 
1 0S ( e ) is discontinuous on 0e e( )  and 1S ( e )  may be less or greater than 1S ( e ) . 
Using simulations we verify that 1 1S ( e ) S ( e )   if   is less than ' 1.45  (with '   
previously defined). Consumer surplus 1 0S ( e ) given by (A18) is the case represented in 
Figure 4 ( 1.4 ' 1.45    ). 
- If U 2   (then ˆe( ) e( ) e( )    ), consumer surplus 1 0S ( e ) is given by: 
2
0
2
0
1 0 0
2 2
02
[ J(1 e( ))] if e e( )
2
xˆ
S ( e ) if e( ) e e( )
2
J if e e( )
8( J 1)
 
 
 
     
 (A19) 
Hence, 1 0S ( e ) is constant on [ 0,e( )] , a decreasing function of e0 on [ e( ),e ( )]  , and 
constant on [ e( ),1] . Note that in this case 1 0S ( e ) is continuous on 0e e( ) . 
Given (A17)-(A18), we then verify the following: 
(i) Private standard with pure selection strategy (when 0e e( ) ). 
In this case *1 0 ˆe ( e ) e( ) e( )   . By using (A18), we obtain the optimal 
surplus
2
*
1 0 1 1 0
[ J(1 e( ))]S ( e ) S ( e ( e ))
2
  . Given that 2 0 0[ J ( 1 e( ))] S ( e 0 )2
    
(under the hypothesis J 2   ) and that 1 0S ( e ) S ( e ) , we verify that 1 0 0 0S ( e ) S ( e )  
for each level of 0e  whereby 0e e( ) . 
(ii) Private standard with proactive strategy (when 0e( ) e 1   ). 
In this case *1 0 ˆe ( e ) 1 e( )  . By using (A18), we obtain the optimal surplus 
2 2
*
1 0 1 1 0 2
JS ( e ) S ( e ( e ))
8( J 1)
   . 
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Given 1 0S ( e ) for each level of 0e  whereby 0e( ) e 1    and simulations on the variations 
of 0 0S ( e )on ˆ[ e( ),1]  previously detailed, and given that 1 0S ( e( )) S ( e( ))  if 
1 '   , we now compare 1 0S ( e ) and 0 0S ( e )  on [e( ),1] . The following situations may 
arise corresponding to increasing levels of  in this context: 
- If1 '   , consumer surplus 0 0S ( e )  adopts a sinusoidal shapeon ˆ]e( ),1[  with 
maximum surplus achieved between eˆ( )  and 1, and 1 0S ( e( )) S ( e( ))  : hence, 
there exist 0eˆ  (with 0ˆe( ) e 1   ) whereby 1 0 0 0S ( e ) S ( e ) iff 0 0eˆ e 1  . (figure 4) 
-If '     , consumer surplus 0 0S ( e )  adopts a sinusoidal shapeon ˆ]e( ),1[  with 
maximum surplus achieved between eˆ( )  and 1, and 1 0S ( e( )) S ( e( ))  ; hence, 
there exist 0eˆ '  and 0eˆ  (with 0 0ˆ ˆe( ) e' e 1    ), whereby 1 0 0 0S ( e ) S ( e )  
if 0 0ˆe ( ) e e'   or 0 0eˆ e 1  , 
- If ˆ     consumer surplus 0 0S ( e )  admits a local maximum and a local minimum 
on ]e( ),1[ with maximum surplus achieved for 0e 1 , and 1 0S ( e( )) S ( e( ))  ; 
hence, 1 0 0 0S ( e ) S ( e )  for each level of 0e  whereby 0e( ) e 1   . 
- If ˆ U    consumer surplus 0 0S ( e )  increases in 0e  on ]e( ),1[ and 
1 0S ( e( )) S ( e( ))  ; hence, 1 0 0 0S ( e ) S ( e )  for each level of 0e  whereby 
0e( ) e 1   . 
- IfU 2   consumer surplus 0 0S ( e )  decreases in 0e  from e( )  to eˆ( )  and then 
increases from eˆ( )  to 1 with 1 0S ( e( ))) S ( e( ))  ; hence, 1 0 0 0S ( e ) S ( e )  for 
each level of 0e  whereby 0e( ) e 1   . 
Effect on the risk 
By substituting (7) into (5) we first verify that the average risk 0 0( e )  in the benchmark 
situation is given using (A5) after posing 1 0e e . 
-Private standard with pure selection strategy. By using (A5), we verify that the risk 
*
1 1 0( e ( e )) is given by *1 1 0 1( e ( e )) (1 e( ))2   , then *1 1 0 0 0( e ( e )) ( e )   for 
each level of 0e  whereby 0e e( ) . 
-Private standard with proactive strategy. By using (A5), we verify that the risk 
*
1 1 0( e ( e )) is given by *1 1 0( e ( e )) 0  , then *1 1 0 0 0( e ( e )) ( e )   for each level of 
0e  whereby 0e( ) e 1   . 
 
